Abstract This article extends the existing literature on optimal provider payment by accounting for consumer heterogeneity in preferences for health insurance and healthcare. This heterogeneity breaks down the separation of the relationship between providers and the health insurer and the relationship between consumers and the insurer. Both experimental and market evidence for a high degree of heterogeneity are presented. Given heterogeneity, a uniform policy fails to effectively control moral hazard, while incentives for risk selection created by community rating cannot be neutralized through risk adjustment. Consumer heterogeneity spills over into relationships with providers, such that a uniform contract with providers also cannot be optimal. The decisive condition for ensuring optimality of provider payment is to replace community rating (which violates the principle of marginal cost pricing) with risk rating of contributions combined with subsidization targeted at high risks with low incomes.
Introduction
Systems to pay for healthcare providers face the dual challenge of moral hazard and selection: if reimbursed according to actual expenditure, providers lack incentives to control costs; if made to bear financial risk in the guise of prospective payment, they may try to reduce costs by lowering the quantity or quality of treatment, engage in patient selection, or opt out of the contract. Ever since the work by Chalkley and Malcomson [1, 2] , the dominant approach has been to determine a share of healthcare expenditure (HCE) to be borne by providers that balances their moral hazard effects against selection incentives. The suggestion is to make this solution the basis of nationwide prospective payment of healthcare providers, reminiscent of Lerner's [3, 4] market socialism.
However, moral hazard effects also characterize patients [5] , while risk selection is also a consumer activity: in the presence of imperfect risk adjustment (RA), low risks seek out an insurer that does not burden them with excessive payment into the RA scheme, whereas high risks seek out one that promises them a high subsidy thanks to the contribution from RA [6] . Therefore, the traditional separation of optimal provider payment from the structuring of insurance contracts is artificial. We argue that it is also misguided, because it neglects the fact that community rating (and other forms of premium regulation) prevent an optimal structuring of health insurance contracts, which in turn makes optimal provider payment impossible. More generally, optimal provider payment cannot be attained as long as health insurers are not permitted to tailor their policies to heterogeneous preferences of consumers.
A simple analogy may illustrate the point. Consider a department store that purchases goods and services from a set of suppliers in the same way as a health insurer does. Both act in anticipation of customers who will exercise options over the products available. Let department store A cater to upscale consumers, with 'Only the best is good enough for you' being its slogan, while department store B serves a more price-conscious clientele. In addition, let there be an unexpected surge in demand. It is evident that A will refrain from pushing its suppliers too hard to increase deliveries in fear of jeopardizing quality, while B may even threaten to change suppliers if the incumbents cannot deliver. Likewise, healthcare financiers, acting on behalf of a clientele with heterogeneous preferences concerning healthcare, need to negotiate with different types of providers in different ways rather than trying to impose a uniform payment scheme.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents arguments designed to show that RA fails to completely neutralize the incentives for risk selection, neglecting preference heterogeneity of consumers at this point. If RA cannot implement the basic 'price equal marginal cost' rule in health insurance, community rating causes inefficiency, even in this most simple case. This holds even more true when consumers exhibit heterogeneity of preferences. In Sect. 3, we argue that preference heterogeneity combined with community rating exacerbates the challenges confronting health insurance, i.e. moral hazard and adverse selection. Section 4 presents empirical evidence suggesting that consumers indeed exhibit substantial preference heterogeneity with regard to attributes of health insurance. This evidence is used in Sect. 5 for a critical review of optimal provider payment as developed by Chalkley and Malcomson [1, 2] . We show that this approach amounts to a simplified form of market socialism in the Lange-Lerner tradition. However, ignoring preference heterogeneity leads to mispricing and inefficiency. Section 6 contains a summary and suggestions designed to enable the development of truly optimal provider payment.
The Impossibility of Shoring up Community Rating Through Risk Adjustment
Any textbook will state the 'price equal marginal cost' rule early on, emphasizing the inefficiencies caused by violations of this rule. In the event that some consumers cannot pay the market price, the recommended remedy is, ''Do not regulate price but let the market do its work; simply have the government pay a subsidy to those consumers who cannot afford the good'' [7] . Yet this advice is often neglected in health economics. It would call for risk-rated contributions in health insurance because the (present value of) future expected HCE constitutes the major part of marginal cost associated with enrolling an extra individual. Rather, much of the literature (with the notable exceptions of Pauly [8] and Bhattacharya et al. [9] ) has accepted community rating as a given, although it has the undesirable side effect of inducing inefficient risk selection and incorrect choices. Here, the term 'community rating' is understood in a broad sense as meaning any regulation prohibiting insurers from charging fully risk-rated contributions. The term therefore comprises variants ranging from German social health insurance (where even family members are insured free of charge) to the US Accountable Care Act (ACA), which permits limited premium variation according to geographical area and age [10] . A number of RA schemes employ diagnostic information to predict HCE; however this not only leaves a good deal of unexplained variation in marginal cost due to unobserved characteristics but also leeway for insurers to influence diagnoses (e.g. by encouraging certain tests). Also, this paper concentrates on individual insurance, which is being expanded by the ACA in the case of the USA and forms the entire market in countries like the Netherlands and Germany. Admittedly, risk selection is less of a problem, e.g. in US group insurance, where employers usually constrain health insurers to accept any member of their workforce.
Yet an insured population always contains high risks, whose (present value of) HCE exceeds the (present value of) contributions under community rating. Therefore, a health insurer who wants to break even needs to enrol low risks for budget balance. The regulatory response has been to introduce RA, which serves to artificially increase the marginal cost of a low risk while lowering that of a high risk to the insurer. But this approach has serious problems, ignoring the interaction of risk selection and moral hazard. On the insurer side alone, it proves exceedingly difficult to neutralize incentives for risk selection through RA [11] . For instance, the regulator would have to also know the insurer's planning horizon for applying the relevant rate of discounting as well as the probabilities of transition between risk categories, which are substantial over a few years [12] . Allowing for moral hazard leads to further problems, discussed below.
However, consumers' incentives for risk selection must be neutralized, too. Like an indirect tax, RA payments are ultimately borne by the (low-risk) insured, while high risks receive an implicit subsidy in the guise of the contribution the insurer gets from the RA scheme. Since RA is necessarily imperfect, this creates an incentive for the low risks to seek out a health insurer helping them avoid this indirect tax, at least in part. Conversely, high risks select an insurer who maximizes the implicit subsidy they stand to obtain. Note that consumers do not need to know RA payments; it is sufficient for them to compare total premium paid to benefits covered. Still, it is often argued that they cannot deal with the lack of transparency caused by the multitude of policies available. To put this argument in perspective, consider a regional market for new cars. Let there be five makes with five models each, giving rise to 25 official list prices appearing in official statistics. Presumably, policy makers would judge the degree of market transparency sufficient. Let there be 50 dealerships each selling 100 cars per year. But purchasers haggle about the value of tradedin cars, outright price reductions, extras ranging from audio equipment to leather seats, financing arrangements, etc. These negotiations result in 'personalized net prices and attributes' for most of the 5000 (=50 9 100) annual transactions. If all these net prices and attribute combinations were published, policy makers would likely note ''a bewildering lack of transparency in the market for new cars''. They do tend to decry the lack of transparency in (private) health insurance because insurers are mandated to publish all details of their policies, which causes the impression of ''bewildering variety.'' Of course, this comparison does not argue against a mandate to offer a standard policy as a fall-back option for those consumers who are not willing or able to perform a search.
Recent research suggests that consumers do indeed respond to variations in premiums (or contribution rates, respectively). Data for 1996-2001 [13] found that market shares of Dutch and German health insurers reacted strongly to premiums (contribution rates, respectively). They estimate a price elasticity of -4.0 among German self-employed (who have to contract for health insurance themselves, with no employer involvement) and -2.5 for Dutch consumers. Using market share data as well [14] found price elasticities of plan choice ranging from -3.7 to -6.2 in their preferred model for the USA.
These findings are corroborated by Turner and Shinnick [15] , who analyzed private health insurance choices by Irish consumers based on surveys performed in 2003 and 2005. In Ireland, private health insurers have been subject to community rating and RA since 1994; they also must provide lifetime cover (also known as guaranteed renewability [GR] ; see the Conclusion section for more detail). Still, policies differ importantly in their benefits, giving rise to the suspicion that structuring benefits may be used to attract favorable risks, as analyzed by, for example, Glazer and McGuire [16] . In some of their regressions, the authors identified age as a significant predictor of choice of more comprehensive coverage; they interpret this as a possible sign of adverse selection. This is puzzling, because age is observable, permitting insurers to contravene adverse selection; more telling evidence would involve consumer characteristics that are not observable to insurers.
The claim that community rating induces risk selection is also confirmed by substantial declines in the purchase of insurance in the US states that mandated it in the 1990s [17] . Partly in response to this experience, the ACA allows some differentiation with regard to age and geographical region. However, the ratio of premiums for the oldest relative to the youngest may not exceed 3.0 [10] . Prior to the ACA, this ratio was 4.5 [18] .
As a final theoretical consideration, Tinbergen's [19] rule states that the number of policy instruments employed to attain a set of targets must be at least as great as the number of targets. Therefore, the single instrument, 'payment into and out of the RA scheme' cannot achieve the two objectives of neutralizing both insurers' and consumers' interest in risk selection as soon as the two groups respond to them to a differing degree, which is likely [6] . Discrepancies between price and marginal cost, with all its consequences in terms of inefficiency, are therefore certain to be permanent in health insurance subject to community rating (and more generally, premium regulation); for a discussion of these consequences, see Tinbergen [19] .
Consequences of Preference Heterogeneity Under Community Rating
As argued recently by Feldstein [20] , health economists have too often ignored differences in consumer preferences. With regard to heterogeneity of preferences for medical treatment, Sculpher [21] presented early evidence concluding that its neglect hurts cost effectiveness in the UK national health service. However, research into heterogeneity with regard to health insurance started much later. Using information on expected HCE for predicting US employees' choice of health insurance plan, Geruso [22] identified age as an important additional source of plan choice. In the case of Australian private health insurance, Buchmueller et al. [23] , while finding systematic differences in preference using a discrete-choice experiment (DCE), concluded that they result in advantageous selection on average, driven by risk aversion, the ability to make complex financial decisions, and income. This limited (and contradictory) evidence still justifies the view that the inefficiencies caused by community rating are seriously compounded when consumers exhibit preference heterogeneity with regard to health insurance. In addition to risk selection, there are two types of problems.
(A) Inability of the insurer to control moral hazard in a targeted way
The optimal rate of co-payment in the presence of expost moral hazard can be shown to depend on no less than five individual-specific parameters [24] .
1. The probability with which the several health states will occur. 2. The level of health associated with each of these states. 3. The marginal utility of consumption associated with health states, which in turn depends on the individual's degree of risk aversion. 4. The elasticity of health with reference to the rate of copayment. 5. The optimal level of health as deemed by the individual, given the trade-offs with other goods.
For co-payment to be accepted voluntarily by a riskaverse individual, it must come with a reduction in contribution from the cost of full coverage, the amount of which depends on his or her degree of risk aversion. However, this is not compatible with community rating, which in principle requires equality of contributions (or at the very least, equality given a certain rate of co-payment). Community rating therefore prevents health insurers from tailoring their contracts to the individual characteristics determining moral hazard.
(B) Reduced insurer incentive to invest in product innovation
In the presence of preference heterogeneity, product innovation serves to match the goods and services offered ever more closely to consumer preferences [25] . In the case of health insurance, premium regulation creates strong incentives for insurers to attract favourable risks through attributes of the contract. This in turn induces regulation designed to prevent it. For instance, exempting paediatric counselling from co-payment is likely to attract young families (yet might be justified as a preventive measure in the interest of public health).
More generally, product innovations are first tried by young consumers, likely because finding out about them constitutes an investment (of time at a minimum). For young consumers, the payback period in terms of utility gains is long enough to justify the investment; for old consumers, the investment is less likely to pay off. By the same token, product innovation in health insurance usually attracts more young than old individuals (see Sect. 4 for empirical evidence). Even if cream skimming was not the intention, the innovative insurer is suspected of it because its insured population will exhibit a comparatively high share of young individuals. In the presence of RA, this entails a financial sanction, because RA formulas invariably include age structure as an adjuster.
One might think that RA at least has the benefit of enabling the regulator to encourage product innovation. Yet RA can have unintended side effects, as evidenced by a seemingly innocuous adjustment of the Swiss RA formula envisaged by the Department of Health as the regulator. The new formula was to include the dummy variable, 'hospitalization during the previous year' as an additional adjuster to overcome the poor predictive performance of RA models and the lack of diagnostic information (Swiss healthcare providers have been successfully blocking the transfer of diagnostic data to insurers). A particular social health insurer, who had been a zero net contributor to the RA scheme on average, commissioned an investigation into the financial consequences of this planned change [26] . The new formula would have caused it to suddenly pay up to 13 % of its premium volume into the RA scheme. Since, as a social health insurer, it is not legally permitted to hold large reserves, this minor change of the RA formula would have likely caused its insolvency.
An in-depth analysis revealed that the cause was not risk selection; on the contrary, this particular health insurer exhibited an above-average share of enrolees beyond the age of 75 years. Rather, it had made efforts (hailed by Swiss policy makers keen to achieve the cost savings promised by Managed Care [MC]) to keep patients out of hospital. The insurer had built an informal second-opinion network that general practitioners could access before referring a patient to the hospital (and transferring control to a hospital-based specialist in most cases). Although not buttressed by particular financial incentives, this network had proved reasonably effective. Yet the consequence of this laudable initiative was that, under the new RA formula, the insurer would have exhibited 'too few' hospitalizations, punishing it for its innovative efforts (the new formula became effective in 2013 only). Experiences of this type are sure to discourage insurer investment in product innovation and efforts aiming at cost control more generally. Indeed, without data on past utilization, RA can adjust for only a very small part of the forward-looking risk. If the RA formula includes past utilization, it discourages insurers from controlling costs and possibly product innovation, as shown in the example above.
Empirical Evidence on Preference Heterogeneity Regarding Health Insurance
Preferably, empirical evidence on preference heterogeneity should be in terms of market outcomes. In the presence of differentiated products, relative marginal utilities associated with product attributes equal relative shadow prices of attributes, reflecting not only goods prices but the 'productivity' of goods in terms of attributes [25] . However, in the case of health insurance, there are distortions at three levels. First, insurance premiums are regulated rather than the outcome of market processes. Second, the prices of goods and especially services entering HCE covered by health insurers are also not market prices (at least outside the USA, where insurers negotiate fees with physicians and hospitals). Third, the quantities entering HCE are influenced by ex-post moral hazard. In this situation, experimental evidence may serve as second-best evidence. One such source is a DCE performed in Switzerland, involving some 1000 participants [27] . Fee for service, combined with unrestricted physician choice, described the status quo in 2003, a contract with several MC attributes, the alternative. The objective was to measure (negative) willingness-to-pay (WTP) values for these MC attributes.
For instance, Table 1 shows that having competitive social health insurers draw up a physician list based on cost only is resisted so strongly that premiums would have to be 36 % lower on average to make this restriction acceptable. Regulation in effect at the time limited the premium reduction for MC plans to 20 %, causing only about 10 % of the insured (those with a low amount of compensation required) to opt for such a harsh health maintenance organization-type variant of MC (for more evidence on preference heterogeneity, see below). However, a physician list taking into account both cost and quality would be accepted in return for 14 % lower premium. Interestingly, choices of respondents revealed that, although regional medical centres would promise higher treatment quality thanks to higher surgical volumes, small community hospitals continued to be favoured. Note that there is positive WTP for the attribute, 'No drugs for minor complaints reimbursed'. However, this quite likely reflects 'warm glow', i.e. a tendency of respondents to value positively attributes they deem socially acceptable [28] . Finally, mandatory long-term care insurance (the only attribute not related to MC) is also resisted by the young (not shown), even though it would have been financed by a premium surcharge of 50 Swiss francs (CHF) per month (17 % of the Swiss nationwide average premium at the time), to be paid by those aged over 50 years.
The bottom line of Table 1 refers to respondents' preference for the status quo. On average, they would have to be compensated by no less than CHF59 (about 20 % of the nationwide premium) to move away from the status quo (which was predominantly 'fee for service' at the time). Since then, the market share of MC (mostly its 'mild' variants such as Independent Practice Association-type physician networks) had been continuously increasing, reaching about 50 % by 2010. This was not deemed sufficient progress by federal politicians, who passed a bill in 2011 calling for MC rather than 'fee for service' to become the standard policy in social health insurance. The bill was challenged by a popular referendum and was defeated at the polls by a two-third majority of voters in June 2012. The voters' verdict suggests that the figures shown in Table 1 are indeed informative of Swiss preferences [29] .
Heterogeneity of preferences between (and within) age groups becomes apparent in Table 2 (mandatory long-term care insurance is not investigated further). As could be expected, the top age group (C65 years) needs to be [27] . Similar DCEs performed in Germany and the Netherlands also showed preference heterogeneity between the subjectively healthy and the chronically ill, with the chronically ill resisting MC-type attributes more strongly, possibly because they fear the lock-in effect of being assigned to a gatekeeping physician [30] . However, between-group heterogeneity is only remotely related to the five individual determinants of moral hazard listed in Sect. 3 above. In Table 2 , within-group heterogeneity actually exceeds across-group heterogeneity in some instances. For example, WTP values in the C65 group for the attribute, 'No drugs for minor complaints reimbursed' have such a high standard error (26.9) that differences within this group exceed the maximum difference between groups (which amounts to 17 = 19 -2 CHF). Since the comparisons in Table 2 are univariate rather than reflecting predicted values derived from a multivariate probit regression, part of this heterogeneity could be related to other observables such as region, sex, and income group. Yet, substantial within-group heterogeneity caused by unobservable characteristics is likely to remain important, as suggested by the systematic differences between the subjectively healthy and chronically ill found by MacNeil Vroomen and Zweifel [30] .
A particular source of heterogeneity is status quo preference. On the one hand, it reflects risk aversion because the alternative is usually associated with more uncertainty than the well-known status quo. On the other hand, it depends on the probability of reaping the returns on the investment (of time at the least) required to understand an alternative to the status quo. In the case of MC-type health insurance, this entails finding out, for example, whether the physician one is familiar with participates in the network. Table 3 indeed reveals a great deal of heterogeneity in this regard, among both participants in the Dutch DCE and those in the German DCE (for details, see Leukert-Becker and Zweifel [31] ; unfortunately, heterogeneity in status quo preference was not analyzed in the Swiss DCE of 2003, precluding a comparison). In the Netherlands, status quo preference does not unambiguously increase with age, whereas in Germany, it clearly does (as one would expect based on the investment argument; part of the difference may also be because the top third of the sample starts at the age of 59 years in Germany rather than at age 55 years as in the Netherlands). The retired exhibit a stronger status quo preference than the non-retired in both countries, quite likely reflecting an increase in risk aversion after retirement [32] .
Risk aversion may also be related to health status. An observable indicator is whether or not a person has seen a physician during the past 12 months. In the two countries, compensation required to overcome status quo preference is up to 45 % higher among respondents with physician visits than among those without any during the past 12 months. However, this between-group heterogeneity is dwarfed by unobservable (to the health insurer at least) within-group differences. Respondents who are subjectively ill would have to be compensated twice as highly than the subjectively healthy to overcome their status quo preference. Findings of this type are relevant for risk selection because unobserved differences in status quo preference may result in sorting processes that cannot be controlled by RA.
Finally, the stage of a reform process in which individuals find themselves may also matter. It is noteworthy that compensation required to overcome status quo preference is lower in the Netherlands than in Germany throughout. This may be a consequence of the fact that, as part of the 2006 reform (which came to an end just prior to the fielding of the DCE), the Dutch were legally obliged to explicitly choose an insurance policy; simply continuing with the existing one was disallowed. Therefore, they were made to bear the cost of learning to choose, similar to the situation for as many as 15 million US citizens after the adoption of the ACA [33] . The evidence presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3 is based on hypothetical rather than actual choices. Evidence from market data in the USA corroborates these experimental results. Studies have shown that the large degree of heterogeneity among US consumers would lead to large gains in economic welfare from expanding choice [34, 35] . Indeed, accommodating heterogeneity was one of the motivating concepts for the design of the US ACA.
Critical Interpretation of Theoretical Research in Light of Preference Heterogeneity
As shown in a companion paper [36] , market socialism is alive and well in a number of Western country sectors, among them, education and health. After the writings of Lerner [3, 4] and Lange [37] and more recently Leeman [38] and Roemer [39] on market socialism, one would expect their emphasis on marginal cost pricing to be reflected in these sectors. Focusing on health insurance, one finds this is not the case. There, marginal cost pricing would require contributions to be graded according to the (present value of) an individual's expected future HCE, the crucial determinant of the cost associated with enrolling an additional person. Yet, community rating forestalls riskrated contributions. However, with the exception of Roemer [39] , who discusses the problem of governance given the separation of ownership and management, the writers cited do not address the asymmetries of information that characterize health insurance. As stated above, moral hazard and adverse selection affect not only the relationship between the consumers and the insurer but also the relationship between the insurer and service providers. The link between the two relationships became evident first in Ellis and McGuire [40] , who modelled providers as double agents of patients and a health insurer. Their approach was complemented by a bargaining component in Eggleston [41] , while Ma and McGuire [42] analysed optimal provider payment when reporting by physicians need not be truthful. However, the seminal contributions [1, 2] as expounded in Zweifel et al. [24] , are reviewed here because they are particularly rich in parameters that permit us to show the consequences of heterogeneity in consumer preferences for optimal provider payment.
There is a financial sponsor (thought to be the government in Chalkley and Malcomson [1, 2] ) who is an expected welfare maximiser. This assumption of a benevolent sponsor is unrealistic for a government agency in view of the law and economics literature [43] [44] [45] . In the case of a health insurer facing competition, it is arguably more realistic, because under sufficient pressure of competition, health insurers cannot deviate much from balancing expected patient benefit from treatment against expected HCE (which determines the premium). Asymmetry of information is taken into account in that quality and treatment outcomes are considered non-verifiable. Payment P is assumed to be of the form,
with F = a fixed component ensuring participation by the service provider and c = the degree of insurer's reimbursement of treatment cost C incurred by the provider, 0\c 1: The provider's participation constraint reads 
where EW ¼ B À cEC À F denotes expected welfare given by patient benefit B net of provider payment according to Eq. (1), B q denotes the relationship between patient benefit and quality, dq=dc, the provider's response in terms of quality to an increase in his or her share in cost, and de=dc, his or her response in terms of cost-reducing effort. The terms dq=dc and de=dc are derived from comparative-static analysis of the provider's objective function (2). Throughout, d 2 EW=dc 2 \0 is assumed. Condition (3) can be solved for 'the' optimal value of c. However, for the following reasons, there will be an entire set of optimal cÃ values as soon as the insured are heterogeneous. It should be noted from the outset that the terms dq=dc and de=dc are far from uniform, depending on physician characteristics such as degree of risk aversion. However, focus is on patient heterogeneity to drive home the fact that optimal payment cannot be determined without taking it into account.
1. B q ðq; eÞ, the relationship between quality and patient benefit, is likely to depend on patient type through plan selection. For instance, consider a Dutch or German participant who feels subjectively ill when called upon to consider an MC-type plan. According to Table 3 , he or she is likely to stick with the current plan (which entails gatekeeping but no additional restrictions in the case of the Netherlands and conventional fee-for service in the case of Germany). Such a person tends to deem an increase in quality to be especially beneficial (at a given value of q), resulting in a high value of B q . Moreover, he or she may resent costreducing efforts on the part of the physician because of a belief that this diminishes the contribution of quality to patient benefit, i.e. B qe \0: With cost-reducing effort e at a comparatively low value in the current plan, B q [ 0 is augmented even more. If dq=dc [ 0 (quality enhanced by increased cost bearing by insurer, a likely effect), condition (3) states that the insurer should set cÃ at a comparatively high value in the interest of such a patient, since at a given value of c\cÃ, the EW function of the sponsor has a more positive slope if B q [ 0 is large than if it is small. 2. EC q ðq; eÞ, the way in which expected cost per case varies with quality is influenced by moral hazard effects on the part of the insured. If facing zero copayment as an extreme, they tend to opt for the highest quality of treatment available regardless of cost. This not only increases EC, but quite likely also EC q (at a given cost-reducing effort level e) because the initial level of costly quality is already high. In the case of patients facing positive co-payment, their degree of risk aversion influences EC as well as EC q . Finally, the differences in WTP values between (and within) age groups regarding the attributes 'Physician list based on cost criteria only' and 'Physician list based on quality criteria' (see Table 2 ) suggest that consumers generally differ in their trade-off between cost and quality of treatment, leading once again to differences in EC q and hence cÃ. 3. V q ðq; eÞ, the degree to which the physician's disutility of cost-reducing effort decreases with quality is also likely to reflect patient heterogeneity. Consider a patient such as a retired person in the Netherlands or Germany characterized by strong status quo preference being offered a new therapy for a chronic condition (see Table 3 ). This exposes the treating physician to a measure of skepticism that distracts from his or her benefit of being able to offer a higher-quality alternative, resulting in a low value of V q . In combination with dq=dc [ 0 (see item 1 above), condition (3) calls for a low value of cÃ and hence a high provider cost share ð1 À cÃÞ in the interest of this type of patient. The reason is that the insurer cannot count on the provider's ethical interest in quality to rein in the moral hazard effect created by increased reimbursement of treatment cost. By way of contrast, middle-aged patients in particular appear to be, on average, strong believers in new medical technology (see the attribute, 'Access to medical innovation delayed 2 years' in Table 2 ) who are presumably grateful to a physician proposing an innovative, quality-enhancing treatment alternative. This suggests a high value of V q (and possibly B q [ 0); with dq=dc [ 0, condition (3) calls for a high value of cÃ and hence a low provider cost share ð1 À cÃÞ in the interest of the middle-aged insured. 4. V e ðq; eÞ, the degree to which effort directed at cost reduction increases physician disutility, also depends on patient characteristics leading to selection. For instance, according to Table 1 , the attribute, 'Physician list based on cost and quality criteria' has a WTP value of -42 (14 % of average premium, respectively) and a standard error of 7.8. Since the 20 % premium reduction that can be legally offered for an MC-type plan corresponds to a WTP value of -29.4, which is 1.62 standard error away from the mean value, the predicted share of Swiss consumers opting for it amounts to approximately 45 %. Therefore, a physician having both conventionally insured and MC patients is confronted with a substantial minority of patients who expect him or her to exert effort to reduce cost as long as it does not clearly compromise quality. When treating a patient of this type, the physician experiences comparatively little disutility when trying to achieve lower cost, implying a low value of V e [ 0. Combined with de=dc\0 (less cost-reducing effort in response to higher reimbursement of cost), condition (3) is satisfied at a low value of cÃ and hence a high provider cost share ð1 À cÃÞ in the case of an MC patient. Also, a common way to achieve cost savings is to prescribe generics. According to Table 2 , this is weakly resisted by the youngest age group but tends to be acceptable to Swiss individuals aged C65 years. It therefore takes comparably little effort to convince a patient in the top age group of the equivalence between a branded and a generic drug. Given the standard assumption V ee [ 0; i.e. increasing marginal disutility of cost-reducing effort, V e [ 0 has a smaller value than when the patient belongs to the group aged 25-39 years.
In view of de=dc\0, condition (3) calls for a high value of cÃ and hence little provider cost sharing ð1 À cÃÞ when it comes to prescription of generics to elderly Swiss patients.
Evidently, each one of the four components entering condition (3) gives rise to a set of different values of ð1 À cÃÞ, the optimal degree of cost sharing by healthcare providers. This may suffice to show that optimal provider payment cannot be determined independently of insured and patient behavior, which is influenced by plan characteristics such as the rate of co-payment. Since the insured are heterogeneous, both plan characteristics such as copayment and provider payment need to reflect this heterogeneity. Of course, creating and launching a set of differentiated plans is not without its own cost. Yet, this differentiation also facilitates negotiations between insurers and healthcare providers because the latter can structure their services in such a way as to attract the patients they prefer. By way of contrast, the experience of Austria, Germany and Switzerland shows that social health insurance with its uniform policies may induce year-long haggling over uniform fee schedules.
However, catering to consumer heterogeneity is hardly possible given community rating (and, more generally, premium regulation). Since downsides such as deductibles, copayment and the MC-type restrictions listed in Table 1 must not lead to differences in contributions, they cannot be compensated by the health insurer via premium reductions. Therefore, plan selection by consumers is guided predominantly by individual preferences, particularly their degree of risk aversion. These differences should optimally be reflected in the way providers are paid. However, they in turn attract differing provider types-which the regulator is likely to view as a tool for cream skimming. Evidently, community rating causes a double welfare loss in the presence of consumer heterogeneity. It prevents health insurers not only from tailoring plans to individual characteristics but also from structuring provider payments in the interest of their clientele.
Summary and Conclusion
The core message of this paper is that premium regulation (in particular, community rating) in health insurance causes inefficiencies not only in the contractual relationship between heterogeneous consumers and insurers but also in that between insurers and service providers. In particular, it blocks the development of optimal provider payment, a fact that has been neglected in the existing literature. The point of departure is the observation that market socialism is prevalent in the healthcare sector, with its many nonprofit and government institutions. This suggests using the prescriptions of market socialism for guidance in the pricing of goods and services. Applied to health insurance, the marginal cost pricing rule would call for contributions reflecting an extra enrollee's future expected HCE, i.e. risk rating of contributions. Community rating disallows this, with all the consequences of deviations from the marginal cost pricing rule predicted by microeconomic theory. Closer inspection and practical experience show that risk adjustment fails to reinstate this rule. Therefore, community rating combined with risk adjustment induces inefficiency in health insurance.
Inefficiency is exacerbated by consumer preference heterogeneity with regard to health insurance, for which there is substantial experimental evidence. Community rating (and premium regulation more generally) prevents health insurers from tailoring their plans to the characteristics of their clientele. Since heterogeneity implies that compensation required for accepting deductibles, rates of co-payment, and MC-type restrictions differs between individuals, premiums need to be reduced to differing degrees. This is not compatible with community rating, causing consumers to select plans exclusively according to their individual preferences, particularly risk aversion. However, in addition, preference heterogeneity requires that the insurer structure provider payment accordingly. Taking the seminal contribution by Chalkley and Malcomson [1, 2] as the example, it turns out that each of the four terms determining the optimal amount of provider cost sharing varies systematically with the characteristics of insurees and patients. However, an insurer who structures provider payment according to the preferences of its enrollees is suspected of engaging in risk selection because this attracts certain types of providers who in turn attract certain types of patients (as argued above). If these links should result in a younger insured population, the insurer incurs a financial sanction due to RA, which invariably uses age as an adjuster. Therefore, community rating causes a double welfare loss. First, consumers do not get what they want; in particular, they cannot be compensated for plan characteristics designed to limit moral hazard effects. Second, the insurer has little incentive to structure provider payment optimally and reflecting the heterogeneity of its clientele.
The lesson for policy is straightforward [36, [46] [47] [48] . Health insurers, both private and social, should be encouraged to risk-rate contributions, resulting in marginal cost pricing of insurance coverage. In a competitive market equilibrium, profit margins do not differ between high and low risks because there cannot be cross-subsidization under the pressure of competition. This means that insurers have no reason to prefer one type over the other, annihilating their incentive to invest in risk selection or to distort their offerings to select favourable risks. In a multi-period setting, they can overcome problems of informational asymmetry by using loss experience to determine risk types and by withdrawing loss-making contracts. In addition, they can implement experience rating of contributions (also known as bonus options), which have been found to rein in moral hazard effects [49] . Another alternative, which may appeal to risk-averse consumers in particular, is GR [50] . Health insurers commit to keeping premiums constant (in real terms at least) in the face of future deteriorations of health status. In return, premiums must cover the present value of expected future HCE, causing them to contain a substantial front loading. Typically, social health insurance features GR but seeks to avoid the upfront loading. The consequence is that the burden is shifted to future generations; indeed, generational accounting shows that, with few exceptions (Australia being one), the present value of future commitments exceeds by far the present value of foreseeable contributions in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries [51] . In the case of Australia, the government confronted a slow death spiral due to adverse selection in 2000 by mandating health insurers to offer GR. They had to neglect health status and even age in their GR premiums, while government mitigated the effect of front loading using tax subsidies [52] . Risk selection by both insurers and consumers (resulting in adverse selection) continues to some extent, indicating that regulated GR premiums do not fully implement the marginal cost pricing rule and therefore fail to achieve efficiency [53, 54] .
Given risk rating of contributions, concerns about risk selection no longer militate against structuring provider payment in the interests of different consumer groups characterized by differences in preferences. If this results in some healthcare providers bringing in groups of insured with low HCE relative to premium paid, they are competed away by health insurers offering them a lower premium. This process comes to an end when profit margins are again equalized across types of consumers.
The standard criticism of such a proposal is that some high risks cannot afford the risk-rated premium. While this is true, it does not justify premium regulation from an economic point of view. The solution typically recommended by economists is to encourage competition to drive prices towards marginal cost while modifying the initial income distribution by taxes and transfers. Therefore, those high risks who cannot afford the premium should receive a tax-financed subsidy, to be targeted not at high risks in general but at high risks of modest means. An annual contribution of, say, $20,000 is affordable to a consumer who earns an income of $200,000 per year. Whether it is deemed affordable for someone earning $100,000 is a political decision to be made by parliament in a representative democracy and voters in a direct democracy. Switzerland provides an illustration of the latter case. In December 1995, the new law on health insurance survived a popular referendum-not least (according to surveys) because it provided for a subsidy for those whose premium would exceed 8-10 % of taxable income (the precise choice of threshold was left to the cantons). One might argue that a tax credit is equivalent to a subsidy. However, this is not true for two reasons. First, from the perspective of a low-income consumer, a premium subsidy is preferable. Many of them do not pay income tax at all, especially in the US, and, for those who do, a tax credit is of relatively little value because their tax rates are low. Conversely, the tax credit is valuable to high-income individuals. Second, from the government's perspective, a tax credit causes a loss in revenue that, however, is not explicitly accounted for, while a subsidy does appear on the expenditure side of its income statement, making it far more visible and hence open to parliamentary debate.
There are downsides to the efficient solution. For one, as argued above, the premium subsidy is transparent, while the cost of premium regulation is hidden. Economists view this transparency as a benefit. For example, in a classic work, Pauly et al. [55] suggest a similar policy, arguing that, ''(The plan) has a very strong advantage in encouraging rational democratic political choice-an advantage to voters, though not necessarily to politicians … The trade-offs between beneficiaries and taxpayers will be obvious and subject to discussion and will likely be decided in open public debate.'' On the other hand, as noted in the citation, transparency may be disliked by politicians who prefer to confer visible benefits to their constituencies while burdening the remainder of society in ways that are not easily recognized. Moreover, premium subsidies may lead to problems of implementation. Political attention may cause the subsidy to become poorly targeted. In some cantons of Switzerland, up to 50 % of households receive a premium subsidy, apparently because local governments sought to ensure their re-election by lowering the threshold below 8 % of taxable income or by narrowly defining 'taxable income'. Finally, in some countries, several social benefits (housing, college support, family allowances) are means tested. Means-tested benefits create disincentives for labour. Tying a subsidy for health insurance to the same income threshold boosts the disincentives for labour supply.
However, the efficiency advantages of risk-rated contributions to health insurance complemented by targeted subsidies seem to be important enough to merit consideration. After all, health insurance improves access to medical care-arguably one of the most personal services there are. Therefore, a policy imposing 'one size fits all' in health insurance must burden the economy with substantial welfare losses. Avoiding them is worth economic argument based on continuing theoretical and empirical research.
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